Horizontal-merger price simulations, which rely upon pre-merger data to predict post-merger prices, have been proposed and used in antitrust policymaking. However, a dearth of closely observed large mergers in differentiatedproduct industries makes empirical investigations of simulation performance extremely difficult, and raises many questions regarding the accuracy of simulation performance. Although a handful of previous studies exist, they focus on short-term simulation performances and ignore long-run effects of mergers. This research investigates the long-run simulation performance and long-run pricing effects of merger in the Korean automobile industry for the period 1991-2010. This period saw the merger of Hyundai and Kia Motors in 1998, a merger caused by the Asian economic crisis and which resulted in the conglomeration of 70 percent of the Korean automobile market.
Introduction
Horizontal merger policy evaluations have been a central agenda in industrial organization. Not only have they served as an active field of research, but they also play a vital role in supporting antitrust policymaking. Because social welfare losses directly result from poor merger policy decisions, both academic researchers and antitrust agencies have paid significant attention to merger policy evaluations. In line with this social importance, economists have put an enormous amount of research effort into such various aspects as merger incentives, merger synergies, capacity expansions, and simulations for post-merger market consequences from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
From an academic perspective, the horizontal merger analyses in homogeneous product industries have been a successful area wherein economic researchers have provided rich evaluation tools for both realized and potential mergers. Starting from a simple theoretical Cournot model (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983) to a sophisticated dynamic model (Gowrisankaran, 1999) , researchers are now well-equipped to investigate diversified aspects of horizontal mergers. In addition, a sizable body of literature represents retrospective studies on observed mergers in homogeneous product industries, including such industries as the US steel industry (Stigler, 1950) , the Italian banking industry (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003) , the European bottled water industry (Compete, Jenny, and Rey, 2002) , and the U.S. feminine hygiene goods industry (Weinberg, 2011) 1 .
In contrast, both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on horizontal mergers in differentiated-product industries are scant. In theoretical analysis, researchers inevitably characterize differentiated-product industries using Bertrand price competitions 2 . Since firms choose multiple prices, economic modeling analyses tend to be quite challenging 3 . In empirical analysis, differentiated-product firms tend to be either large-sized firms or firms that are locally concentrated, given their abilities to supply multi-differentiated products. As such, proposed mergers are likely to be challenged and blocked by local antitrust authorities 45 . Although researchers have proposed a small number of vital merger-evaluation tools, e.g. Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 , the dearth of empirical horizontal-merger observations in large differentiated-product industries inhibits investigation into these proposed tools' performance.
The left side of Figure 1 depicts the fundamental difficulty in the empirical horizontal-merger literature. Since researchers cannot observe post-merger market consequences when mergers are blocked, they are unable to investigate the performances of Nevo's simulation method for these mergers 6 . Consequently, there are only a handful
It turns out that, by incorporating these observed post-merger information, I can account for 61 percent of long-run price discrepancies. By observing a large fraction of simulation discrepancies which one can account for in the observed post-merger information, this research suggests that when antitrust policy makers apply the results of simulations, they must take into account changes in factors which the simulation model takes as exogenous.
Literature
The recent literature on differentiated-product horizontal mergers evolves with the development of sophisticated differentiated-product demand estimation methods. Berry (1994) [4] and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, henceforth BLP) [5] propose differentiated product demand estimation methods that can be reliably used for horizontalmerger analysis. Nevo's research (2000, 2001 ) [31] [32] forms the corner-stone, wherein he proposes a simulation method that emphasizes changes in firm ownership, using the demand-estimation method that BLP proposed a few years earlier. Nevo 's method provides the structural framework that enables us to derive post-merger prices using only pre-merger data and information on ownership transitions. Based on this seminal work, several analyses examining blocked mergers followed 10 . However, only two papers have applied Nevo's simulation framework to a differentiated-product industry merger that actually occurred in the real world. Nevo (2000) [31] investigates two mergers in the U.S. cereal industry. His study, however, only uses short-term post-merger data and is unable to investigate the long-run consequences of observed mergers. Peters (2006) [34] investigates five airline mergers observed in the United States during the 1980s, and he faced significant modeling difficulties 11 . By comparing simulated and observed short-term post-merger prices 12 , Peters (2006) reports mixed results in simulation performance.
In summary, the literature provides only two empirical case studies that investigate the short-term performance of the post-merger price simulation method, and leaving questions of its reliability 13 . This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating simulation reliability both in the short term and in the long run after the merger 14 .
Settings and Organization of Paper
I apply four important settings throughout this paper. First, all prices used in this research are adjusted for inflation using Korea's consumer price index 15 . Second, I uniformly applied a 1,000 won = 1 U.S. dollar ex- 10 For example, Dube (2005) [12] investigates the attempted but blocked mergers between Coca Cola-Dr. Pepper and Pepsi-7Up. Fan (Working paper) [13] examined a blocked merger in the Minneapolis local newspaper industry. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) investigate the attempted but blocked merger between heavy truck manufacturers in Europe, Volvo and Scania. Grzybowski and Pereira (2007) studied the attempted merger between the Portuguese mobile telephone service providers, TMN Mobile and Optimus Mobile. 11 I recognize the difficulty of applying demand estimation and supply-side modeling to the airline industry. Any consumer demand model has to include both hub and spoke airport demands. Any supply-side model must include complicated pricing systems such as mileage points, first versus economy class price differences, and early ticket purchase discounts. 12 Peters (2006) compares simulated prices and prices that were observed one year after airline mergers. 13 Specifically, the literature lacks investigations on this simulation's long-run performance. 14 Potential weaknesses of this paper should be noted here. I do not have panel-market data, and I am unable to use the multi-markebased instrument variables as suggested by Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) [20] . In my post-merger price simulations, I solve 31 to 37 dimensional simultaneous non-linear system equations and computations tend to be unstable. I have plant-level production and input/output data. However, I do not have brand-(automobile model) level production data, and am unable to recover brand-level production marginal costs from the data available. change rate when representing prices 16 for the sake of easily understandable prices. Third, since the announcement of the Hyunai-Kia merger in November 1998, I define January-1991 through November-1998 as the pre-merger regime and December-1998 through December-2010 as the post-merger regime 17 . Lastly, I concentrate my research on passenger cars, ignoring trucks 18 and other commercial vehicles such as buses.
I organize the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 describes the automobile industry in Korea; Sections 3 and 4 explore the demand-and supply-side models and provide estimation results; Section 5 evaluates the benchmark simulation result and reports long-run simulation discrepancies; Section 6 lists potential causes in long-run simulation discrepancies; Section 7 accounts for long-run price discrepancies by using observed post-merger market data; and Section 8 concludes the study by suggesting future courses of research.
Description of the Automobile Market in Korea
Throughout this paper, I define the Korean automobile market as comprising the entirety of South Korea which remains geographically separated from other markets 1920 . this market is distinct in the following four ways: (1) Korea experienced an economic crisis and sales shares of imported-cars have been extremely small ever since; (2) five Korean domestic manufactures oligopolize the market; (3) the Hyundai-Kia merger occured in November 1998 and conglomerated 70 percent of the market, before which there was only one entry, Samsung Motors (February 1998);
and (4) vehicle prices in Korea have been increasing since the Hyundai-Kia merger. In this section, I describe 16 In general, there are many zeros in prices in Korean won, making it difficult to get a sense of numbers. Although the won-dollar exchange rate is volatile, the long-term average remains close to 1,000 won = 1 U.S. dollar. With this general exchange rate in mind, a
Hyundai Sonata price of 20,829,000 won simply becomes U.S. $20,829. 17 I do not have data from prior to January 1991. 18 Unlike in the United States, pickup trucks are not popular in Korea. 19 South Korea (the Republic of Korea), located on the southern half of the Korean peninsula, is geographically separated from trade partners by North Korea and surrounding ocean. 20 The dataset used in this paper is a single-market dataset, similar to the dataset used in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pake (1995) [5] . I
do not have smaller market data such as province-level sales data. the automobile market in Korea with emphasis on these four points, and make connections to estimations and simulations discussed in later sections. Figure 3 illustrates the monthly sales of domestically produced cars and imported cars (in number of automobiles sold) in South Korea for 1991-2010. There are two notable findings in Figure 3 : First, the market experienced the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1999, during which time automobile sales slumped. This economic crisis led to mergers and acquisitions among Korean domestic automobile manufactures, which I will explain in the latter part of this section. Second, imported car sales shares have remained extremely low, typically less than 2 percent of total sales 2122 , and the majority of Korean automobile buyers have purchased domestically-produced cars. Because of such small shares, I ignore imported car sales in the rest part of this paper.
The Asian Economic Crisis and Imported Car Sales

Oligopoly with Five Domestic Automobile Manufactures
One can describe the Korean automobile market as highly concentrated in a five-firm oligopoly: Hyundai, Kia, 2003, the merged Hyundai-Kia group seems to have adopted unilateral pricing strategies. As a whole, one can clearly observe long-run price increases in Figure 6 .
Some may question whether vehicle price increases in Korea were caused by product quality improvements. To investigate this possibility, I compare Hyundai-Sonata and Hyundai-Avante 31 pricing histories in the United States and in Korea. Figure 7 indicates that prices in Korea largely increased after the merger, while prices in the United
States increased only moderately. Assuming that market competition conditions in the United States remained unchanged, a quality increase alone could not explain the drastic price increases observed in Korea 32 .
Data Source
I collected data from various sources. First, I compiled monthly passenger vehicle price data from two monthly automobile magazines widely circulated in South Korea, Carlife Magazine and Motor Magazine. These two monthly needed time to make management-level integrations. 31 Hyundai Avante is sold under the name of Elantra in the United States. 32 Automobile buyers generally perceive that Korean automakers have increased their product quality in recent years. In the United
States, Hyudnai-Sonata and Hyundai-Elantra prices have increased about 10 percent, and I attribute these price increases to the quality improvement. Note that the prices of Hyudnai-Sonata and Hyundai-Elantra have increased 26 percent and 38 percent in Korea. 
Demand Side Model and Estimations
This section describes the demand side model and estimation results. I use these estimates to compute substitution patterns in post-merger price simulations in later sections of this paper.
Demand Model
The demand model builds upon Berry's (1994) instrumental variable (henceforth IV) nested-logit model. For notational simplicity, I denote t ∈ {1, · · · , T } to index months, i ∈ {1, · · · , I t } to index households at time t, j ∈ {1, · · · , J t } to represent supplied automobile brand index at time t, q ∈ {1, · · · , Q} to be quarter dummy, and g ∈ {1, · · · , G} to be automobile type group index 40 . In particular, g j indicates the automobile type group to which brand j belongs. The (after taking log) Cobb-Douglas utility function is expressed as
where d qt is quarter dummy, p jt is brand j's price at time t, x jt is brand j's observable characteristics vector, ξ jt is an unobserved (by researchers) product characteristic. Quarter dummies are included to proxy incomes. Consumer 33 To collect vehicle prices, the editors of these two magazines call local dealers and gather dealership-level prices. Prices of a specific automobile brand in a specific month listed in these magazines prove close but not identical. Typically, price differences come within $500 of each other. I believe such non-identical prices are a good signal of accuracy, since they seem to reflect dealership-level price heterogeneities. 34 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pake (1995) [5] also extracted price and sales quantity data for the U.S. automobile industry from these yearbooks. 35 I could not obtain vehicle brand-level production data. Since a single automobile plant produces multiple vehicle brands, this dataset does not allow me to recover the brand-level production marginal costs. However, I was able to evaluate productivity improvement (merger synergy) after the Hyundai-Kia merger through the production function estimation analysis. See Appendix for details. See Table 11 in Appendix for details of these group categorizations.
taste parameters ({(θ 2 , · · · θ Q ), α, β, σ)} are to be estimated. Note that ζ igj captures individual i's taste over group g j , and (1 − σ)ε ijt captures individual i's idiosyncratic taste for product j. Specifically, the parameter σ ∈ [0, 1]
captures the degree of inside group substitutions. If σ is close to one, consumer i becomes more likely to substitute to products within the same automobile type group. On the other hand, if σ is close to zero, consumer i substitutes across all type groups. Following Berry (1994) [4] , I make distributional assumptions. Both ε ijt and ζ igj + (1 − σ)ε ijt follow an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution. By integrating, I obtain the analytic market shares as follows
where I denote a mean utility
Berry (1994) [4] inverted the above market share and obtained
where s 0t is an outside goods (not purchasing cars) share 42 and s gj t is the market share of group g j at time t. Table 3 describes the automobile brand group categorization used in this research: (i) Small-and Compact-size,
Automobile Brand Nesting Group Categorizations
(ii) Mid-size, (iii) Mid-and Full-size luxury, and (iv) Jeep, Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV), and Minivan. I categorize these four groups based on price differences and functionalities. The Small-and Compact-size group cars are priced substantially lower than cars in other groups, and the restrictions on consumer budgets keep substitutions to other groups implausible. The cars in the Mid-and Full-size luxury group are priced higher than cars in the other groups.
The Mid-size group and the Jeep, SUV, and Minivan group are divided based on their functionalities. Buyers of 41 The outside option (not purchasing a car) at time t is δ 0t = Q q=2 θqdq t in this model. I normalize quarter 0 outside option mean utility to be δ 00 = 0.
42 I define the market size as the number of households in Korea, extracted from the Korean National Census in 1990, 1995, 2000, 
Price Elasticities
The advantage of the instrumental variable nested-logit is its simplicity in computing price elasticities. From equation (2), one can derive own and cross price elasticities,
and one can calculate these elasticities based on estimated (α, σ) and observed market shares 43 . Table 4 lists descriptive statistics. By comparing pre-and post-merger variables, several notable differences appear.
Descriptive Statistics
First, the mean of the inflation adjusted vehicle price is higher in the post-merger regime, as a natural consequence of market conglomeration after the Hyundai-Kia merger. Second, the mean size had increased (and mean of Km/l has decreased), since a greater variety of large size cars, SUVs, and minivans became available in 2000s. Third, as numbers of supplied vehicle brands had increases after the Hyundai-Kia merger, the mean of shares (and the mean of in-group share) decreased. 43 Price derivatives are
These derivatives are used for simulations.
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Choice of Instrumental Variables
The major difficulty in estimating equation (3) . As material costs are positively correlated with price, but unlikely to be correlated with unobserved product characteristics, the above cost shifter becomes a valid instrument. Furthermore, (2)- (4) measure the degree of market competition. The more products other firms offer, the more severe the competition. To measure precisely the degree of competition, I classified the vehicles into nine classes (automobile types), and take summations of each observed product characteristic within each class (see Table 11 in Appendix for details of classifications). Since competition becomes more severe with a larger number of competing products, instruments (2)- (4) are negatively correlated with observed prices. However, instruments (2)- (4) are unlikely to be correlated with unobserved product characteristics ξ jt 45 . Table 5 reports estimation results and calculated own elasticities based on equation (4) . In addition to the instrumental variable nested-logit demand model, I also estimate OLS logit and instrumental variable logit demand models for comparisons. I separate the dataset into pre-merger regime data (years 1991-1998) and post-merger regime data (years 1999-2007), since I use only pre-merger regime data for the basement simulation. Price coefficients derived 44 Because the Korean won historically has highly volatile exchange rates, Korea's Importer Price Index is also volatile. See Figure   10 . 45 I recognize there is a subtle endogenous product line choice concern in this statement. There are at least four possible scenarios of endogeneity:
Demand Estimation Results and Estimated Elasticities
(A) If ξ jt is large, i.e., product j is attractive ⇒(A-1) competing firms introduce copy-cat products into a market ⇒(A-2) competing firms consider competition with product j difficult, and do not introduce rivaling products (B) If ξ jt is small (or very negative), i.e. product j is unattractive ⇒(B-1) competing firms consider a profit opportunity, and introduce rivaling products that beat out product j ⇒(B-2) competing firms do not consider producing similar cars profitable, and do not introduce rival products These four scenarios provide opposite consequences in terms of endogenous product line choices. I believe all of these scenarios are possible and, in general, ξ jt does not correlate to (2)-(4). Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5] use similar instruments. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
** indicates t-statistics are significant within 5 percent.
IV used: IV logit model -Cost-shifter for both pre-and post-merger data (thus, just-identified model).
IV used: IV Nested logit model - (1), (2), and (4) for pre-merger data; (1), (2), and (3) for post-merger data.
Note that in the instrumental variable nested-logit estimations, I removed IV (3) for pre-merger data and IV (4) In this research, I define market size as all households in Korea, and only tiny portions of the households buy automobiles in any given month. Thus, s jt is close to zero. Then, own price elasticities are almost perfectly proportional to prices. As a result, low-price cars tend to have inelastic demands. This result contradicts our empirical observation that buyers of low price cars are elastic and price This analysis reveals drastic differences between the estimated pre-merger and post-merger regimes' preferences.
To understand such drastic preference changes, I briefly note the history of the Korean economy and its motor- My pre-merger regime estimation results agree closely with this historical observation. Consumers were relatively elastic and preferred non-large-size and fuel-inefficient (but cheap) vehicles in the pre-merger regime (1991-1998).
The household environment dramatically changed after the recession. As the economy escaped from the recession and the recovery boom arrived in 2000-2002. Rebounding from recession, banks largely relaxed their credit-inquiry sensitive. Thus, the logit-demand model remains inappropriate in this research. Note that the nested logit demand model improves this defect by accounting for in-group shares in elasticity calculations. 48 In Table V requirements 52 , and households obtained generous loan opportunities, including auto loans. They also began to replace their initial cars, and households typically chose more expensive cars than the cars they had initially purchased. After 2002, the Korean economy has continued to grow without serious economic stagnation (the average worker wage increased 30 percent compared to that of pre-merger regime, see Table 7) , and more and more expensive cars became affordable to Korean households. Post-merger regime estimation results agree with these observations.
Korean automobile buyers became relatively inelastic with higher wages and more access to auto loans. In addition, they preferred larger size cars, and they also evaluated fuel-efficiency in the post-merger regime. These estimated preferences reflect the introduction of a number of SUVs into the Korean domestic market and the continued rise of gasoline prices during the 2000s. 
Supply Side Model
In this section, I describe the supply side model used to recover marginal costs and post-merger price simulations.
Here, I strictly follow the simulation framework proposed by Nevo (2000) [31] and Nevo (2001) [32] . Third, widely circulated automobile magazines, containing lists of automobile prices, have been available since the late 1980s, and automobile buyers have been well-informed about automobile prices. Other forms of competition, such as competition through choosing sales quantities, are highly unlikely to reflect these three observed facts. As some may argue over my choice of the static competition model, I will return to this point in a later portion of this paper. Firms that choose automobile band prices maximize profits as follows:
Firms' Optimization Problem
where f ∈ [1, · · · , F ] represents a firm, F f t is a set of products which firm f supplies to the market at time t, mc jt is the marginal cost of product j, p t is a price vector and its dimension is equal to the number of total products available at time t, M t is the number of households in Korea, and C f t is fixed cost. The first-order necessary condition can be derived as where Ω t and S t (p t ) are a square product ownership and substitution matrices with (m, n) entries are (m: row index and n: column index) Ω t,mn = 1 if product m and n are supplied by the same firm 0 otherwise
and × is the entry-by-entry multiplication. All of the right-hand side variables in equation (6) are observed or estimated; Ω t is observed in data, S t can be calculated from equation (5) with estimated parameters, and s t is observed market share. Therefore, one can calculate markups from observed data and estimated parameters.
Furthermore, by subtracting markups from observed prices, we can also calculate marginal costs. Table 6 contains calculated markups and marginal costs for brands that were supplied in November 1998 (merger announcement month). Since the calculated markups and marginal costs fluctuate month to month, I take the averages over months in the pre-merger regime. Recovered markups roughly agree with those reported in BLP (1995) and calculated marginal costs are used for post-merger price simulations.
Post-Merger Price Benchmark Simulation
In this section, I describe the post-merger price simulation framework, benchmark simulation assumptions, and benchmark simulation results. I use the simulation framework explained in this section throughout the rest of this 18 paper, although I will change simulation assumptions.
Simulation Framework
The post-merger price simulation follows the framework suggested by Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 [31] [32] . The simulation process comprises the inverse operation of calculating markups and marginal costs. Rewriting the firms' profit maximizing first-order condition equation (6) with slight notational modifications,
wheremc is the vector of estimated pre-merger marginal cost (averaged out over the pre-merger period) and 
Benchmark (Conventional) Simulation Assumptions
Here, I list the assumptions for a post-merger price simulation, which are conventionally assumed in the differentiatedproduct industry horizontal-merger literature. These assumptions are de-facto standard assumptions in such postmerger price simulation analyses as Nevo (2000) 55 , [31] Dube (2005) [12] , and Peters (2006) [34] .
Benchmark (Conventional) Assumptions:
(I-1) Consumer income conditions will remain the same after a merger (II-1) Consumer preferences (including unobserved product characteristics) will remain the same after a merger (III-1) Marginal costs will remain the same after a merger (IV-1) Product line will remain the same after a merger
In the benchmark simulation computation, I materialize the above (I-1)-(IV-4) by using, Benchmark (Conventional) Assumptions: Implementations (I-2) Applying the average of pre-merger quarter dummies (which are income proxies),θ qt (II-2) Applying pre-merger consumer preference (α,β,σ) and average of pre-merger unobserved characteristicsξ jt (III-2) Applying the average of pre-merger marginal costsmc jt (IV-2) Using the pre-merger product line (product line supplied in Nov. 1998, the merger announcement month)
One should recognize these assumptions as averaged pre-merger information. By using them, I am explicitly assuming that market conditions of (I-2)-(IV-2) will not change after the merger. In the next section, I re-compute observed changes in each of (I-2)-(IV-2) with other factors fixed (Ceteris Paribus approach).
55 Note that Nevo (2000) [31] , the inventor of this simulation method, clearly expressed his concerns about these simulation assumptions, "However, this approach is not consistent with firms changing their strategies in other dimensions [than price dimension] that may influence demand. For example, if as a result of the merger the level of advertising changes, and advertising influences price sensitivity, then the estimate of the post-merger equilibrium price based on [simulation equation] will be wrong. In addition. this implies that characteristics, observed and unobserved, and the value of the outside good are assumed to stay the same pre-and post-merger.
Therefore, I am implicitly assuming that the price of the outside good is exogenous and does not change in response to the merger."
See (p.403) of his paper. 
Benchmark Simulation Results
The simulated post-merger aggregate price is obtained as follows. I first obtain simulated prices for all vehicle brands by solving the non-linear simultaneous equation (7). Then, using the equation (2), I calculate market shares for each vehicle brand, and sales weighted aggregate market prices are calculated. · 100). There are several potential reasons for this long-run price discrepancy, and I will investigate them in the next section 57 .
56 This result should be interpreted with the following strong cautions. First, even in the short-term, market conditions changed significantly. Consumer incomes conditions (including automobile loan opportunities), supply side marginal costs, and product lines changed greatly as I will explain in the next section. Second, the merged Hyundai-Kia group seemed to refrain from making unilateral price increases until the end of 2002. Thus, the benchmark simulation assumptions (I-2)-(IV-2) did not hold even in the short term, and the simulated price is close to the observed price almost by coincidence. 57 Another notable finding is that it took two and-a-half years from the time the merger was announced for market participants to reach predicted post-merger prices. In theoretical merger models, if a merger happened yesterday, a merged firm increases its product prices today (and rival firms also increase prices today). In reality, the effect of a merger does not appear immediately because of many real-world conditions such as (1) a merged firm needs time to be organizationally reconciled, (2) menu costs, or (3) fear of consumers and media backlash in the wake of price increases. 
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Potential Causes in Long-Run Simulation Discrepancies
There are several possible reasons for long-run price discrepancies. In this section, I list potential causes using observed post-merger data. These causes become the basis for the simulated price discrepancy analysis discussed in the next section.
I: Post-Merger Changes in Consumer Income
The first factor to review is the change in consumer (household) income. Table 7 (1) increase with these increases in wages. Given this increase in wages, and given other factors remain unchanged, it is optimal for firms to charge prices higher than pre-merger regime prices. Therefore, changes in wages (incomes) are part of the explanation for price increases.
II: Post-Merger Changes in Consumer Preferences
Changes in consumer preferences constitute the second and largest factor. Table 5 indicates that automobile buyers in Korea had become price inelastic in the post-merger regime. The mean elasticity with instrumental variable nested-logit model in pre-merger regime is −4.13, while it is −2.32 in the post-merger regime. Given that other factors remain unchanged, firms can charge higher vehicle prices without losing much demand with this estimated post-merger preference. Thus, one can expect that the non-trivial portions of price increases can be explained by preference changes. Note: Post-merger marginal costs are derived with IV nested-logit post-merger demand estimation results that use post-merger data. Only five brands listed above were consistently sold from December 1999 through December 2010 without brand terminations.
III: Post-Merger Changes in Marginal Costs
Reductions in marginal costs forms the third dimension of post-merger change 58 . One can expect that, once merged, the new Hyundai-Kia would improve productivity due to merger synergy 59 . Unfortunately, since Korean automobile manufactures frequently changed their product lines both before and after the merger, direct marginal cost comparisons are difficult. Table 8 compares the marginal costs in both pre-and post-merger regimes among brands that had been continuously sold without brand terminations. Note that I recover these marginal costs from estimated demand elasticities, observed shares, and observed prices by using equation (6) . I observe that both prices and marginal costs increased in the post-merger regime, while the (
marginal cost price
) ratio decreased.
Since direct comparisons of vehicles' pre-and post-merger marginal costs are difficult due to frequent brand terminations, I use the plant-level input/output data to measure marginal cost improvement. In Appendix, I
implement value-added-base production function estimations, and observe the statistically significant merger synergy effects among Hyundai-Kia group plants. Thus, the (value-added basis) marginal production costs of Hyundai-Kia group cars decreased after the merger, and affected post-merger vehicle prices.
IV: Post-Merger Changes in Product Lines
Product lines make up the fourth factor of post-merger change. For a merged firm, terminating intra-firm competing products would seem to be one f the optimal strategies for increase profits. Table 9 demonstrates that a significant number of Hyundai-Kia groups' vehicle bands were terminated between November 1998 and November 2003 (a period of 5 years after the merger announcement). The merged company primarily terminated brands of former Kia Motors, and one can observe significant changes in the product line. In particular, Kia's small-to mid-size luxury car line underwent drastic changes, including the elimination of some of its best-selling brands. In addition, terminated brands coincide with low-markup percentage brands in Table 6 . I view these brand terminations as the merged Hyundai-Kia groups' differentiated product organization. In other words, a merged firm has an incentive to terminate intra-firm competing brands to maximize profit 60 .
58 Post-merger marginal cost reductions, called merger synergy, are heavily debated in the homogeneous product industry merger literature. See Gowrisankaran (1999) [17] for the literature review. 59 I had a chance to interview a former Kia Motors worker. He mentioned that Kia Motors had better large-size engine production technologies (for SUVs and Minivans) than Hyundai did before the merger, whereas Hyundai held advantages in sedan production. 60 This topic relates to endogenous product choices (product positioning). Although I do not model endogenous differentiated-product positioning in this paper, in the conclusion section, I will mention future extensions of this project that would examine the dynamics of 22 Crossover SUV SantaFe (7) Sorento (19) Minivan/MPV Santamo Carnival (15) Minivan/MPV Trajet (32) Compact Minivan/MPV Lavita Carens (14) A brand name with a strike-thorough indicates a brand terminated at some point during December 1998 -November as a numerical variable in this research, and are not included in the subsequent analysis in this paper 62 .
VI: Post-Merger Changes in Material Costs
An increase in material costs could be a major cause of price increases. Figure 10 . These observations suggest that 62 Note that unobserved product characteristics, ξ jt 's, are not direct measures of product quality. Rather, ξ jt 's are recovered as residuals in equation (3), and depend on other products supplied in the market. In general, researchers rarely observe quality improvements in data in numerical forms. A notable exception is Leslie and Jin (2003), wherein restaurant hygiene scores (measures of restaurant qualities) are observed and policy impacts of newly introduced hygiene grade cards are investigated. 63 Since Korea is not rich in natural resources, Korean manufacturing industries import materials from abroad. 64 I observe that fringe (small-scale) firms raised their vehicle prices about 2 to 6 months after the Hyundai-Kia group raised its prices.
The Edgeworth price cycle model, suggested by Maskin and Tirole (1998) and empirically analyzed by Noel (2007 Noel ( , 2008 Noel ( , 2009 Noel ( , 2010 and Lewis (working paper) with gasoline industry data, may capture such price movements. In addition, these observations decrease the likelihood of industry-wide collusion, as firms raise prices simultaneously in a situation of perfect collusion. Furthermore, dynamic price 24 part of the long-run simulation price discrepancy can be explained by the changes in supply side competition.
In summary, all of the changes described above (and numerous other changes not discussed here 65 ) are likely to have occurred simultaneously in the post-merger regime, and thus to have contributed to vehicle prices in Korea.
In the next section, I break down the changes in consumer incomes, preferences, marginal costs, and product lines, and investigate their contributions to discrepancies between observed and simulated prices. Table 10 lists the results of each partial contribution of the post-merger changes for improving (average of observed long run minus basement simulation) price discrepancy, given other changes unapplied. I observe that consumer income increased 30.9 percent after the Hyundai-Kia merger (see Table 7 ). Applying (I-4), which increases average Lastly, there remains an unexplained portion of simulation discrepancy. However, note that such post-merger changes as product quality improvements and changes of supply side competition could explain the remaining simulation discrepancy. In particular, unobserved product quality improvements are likely to be the major component.
A Ceteris Paribus (Partial Contribution) Evaluation in Post-Merger Changes
A consensus exists among automobile industry specialists that Korean automobile manufactures improved their product quality throughout the 2000s 74 . Such quality improvements ideally should be observed and incorporated in simulations. However, product quality improvements are, unfortunately, not numerically observed in this research and thus remain in the unexplained discrepancy.
69 The uniform 5 percent marginal cost reductions are temporarily assumed. I am currently working on production function estimations and recovering marginal costs using observed wage and rental rate data. Using recovered marginal production costs, I will attempt to investigate the merger synergy effect (TFP improvement) after the Hyundai-Kia merger. 70 This result marks a contrast to the marginal cost reduction seen in perfectly substitutable homogeneous goods markets. In a homogeneous product market with Bertrand price competition and given that marginal costs are identical, one expect a 5 percent market price decrease with a 5 percent marginal cost reduction. In a differentiated-product market, the effects of marginal cost reductions are weakened by imperfect substitutions. 71 Since both (IV-4) and (III-4) change marginal costs, (IV-4) cannot be applied with (III-4). 72 Exogenous to the simulation model. 73 In this case study, post-merger preference changes play the most significant role in creating long-run simulation discrepancy.
However, in other cases such as a horizontal merger in the cereal industry, post-merger supply side changes in marginal cost and product lines could play substantial roles. 
Conclusion and Future Extensions
This paper demonstrates empirically that the post-merger price simulation method proposed by Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 [31] [31] can offer reasonable performance in predicting shot-term post-merger prices, although, in this case study, some of the simulation assumptions changed even in the short term. Nonetheless, using this simulation reveals significant long-run discrepancies between observed and simulated prices. This research also investigates counterfactual simulations, which take into account observed post-merger changes in the market. Counterfactual simulations exemplify that changes in consumer incomes and preferences, and marginal costs can explain the majority of simulation discrepancies. This ex-post evaluation of simulation performance suggests that, when antitrust policymakers apply the results of post-merger price simulations, they must take into account possible changes in factors that the simulation model takes as exogenous.
One can expand this research in two important directions. The first direction involves modeling supply-side endogenous product positioning 75 , a currently active research area in the empirical industrial organization literature.
75 E.g.: Such differentiated-product firms as magazine publishers or beer manufactures dynamically allocate their products on the product space. They organize their product positioning to correspond to changes in costs, government regulations, and consumer tastes.
Importantly, the effect of such policy changes as tighter environmental regulations or tax increases depends on how firms react to new market conditions by reallocating their differentiate products. For example, market effects of the currently debated "sugar tax" depend on how quickly food (or soda) manufacturers react to the sugar tax by changing their product lines. Volkswagen groups. 80 Hyundai Motors' famous "10 years or 100,000 miles" warranty in North America began in 1999, right after the Hyundai-Kia merger.
In this appendix, I describe the construction of aggregated prices. I use two objective criteria for creating representative prices and denoting P as aggregated price or price by firm, p as observed price, and q as observed sales quantity.
Sales Weighted Prices
The definition of sales weighted prices:
( These prices are plotted on 9.
Indexed Prices
Index weight are defined as w j,period = Sales quantity of brand j in a specific period Total sales quantity in a specific period . 
Plant Level Data
Production and cost functions are estimated with data from Korean Annual Mining and Manufacturing Survey which contains annual plant level data 83 . The plant information is summarized in Table 13 .
Firms' Cost Minimization Problem
I assume a production function has the Cobb-Douglas form 
Production Function Estimation
For estimation, we assume the production function is
By taking natural logarithm, we have y jpT = a j + α k k jpT + α l l jpT + ε jpT where I define y jpT = log Y jpT , a jpT = log A j , k jpT = log K jpT , l jpT = log L jpT . Note that I use firm level heterogeneity term a j which is different from plant level heterogeneity. It is ideal to estimate both firm and plant level heterogeneities, although the small sample size restricts such possibilities. Table 17 contains bank-to-firm loan rates and manufacturing sector worker wage in Korea (hourly wages). Loan rates decreased after the Hyundai-Kia merger, while hourly wages have kept increasing.
Loan Rates and Worker Wages
84 I am currently working on organizing plant-level investment data to implement the production function estimation method proposed by Olley-Pakes [33] .
